MEASURING PROGRESS AND EFFECTS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE
There is broad agreement that in the future the U.S. military will continue to face irregular threats such as it has seen throughout the last ten years. Within the last five years both U.S. Army doctrine and the U.S. military's joint doctrine have acknowledged the significance of irregular threats. Because of these threats both have recognized that the character of the wars the U.S. is currently fighting and will likely fight in the future contain an irregular aspect that the U.S. military must confront. In order to be successful in irregular warfare, as in all warfare, one must be able to accurately measure progress and effects. In a type of warfare that relies less on dominating terrain and attriting enemy forces than it does on influencing people, such measures of progress and effects are not as obvious as they are in traditional warfare. Furthermore, understanding such warfare requires much more than only understanding the actions of two opposing forces. In complex environments such as insurgencies and other irregular warfare activities the number of variables that affect the situation may be so great that a force may never have enough information to truly understand such a complex, constantly changing environment. 1 How then should a force measure its progress and effects when conducting irregular warfare activities? As Clancy and Crossett point out, -we do not yet possess a framework within which we might interpret success or failure against insurgency or terrorism operations. Nor do we have a solid set of measures of effectiveness (MOE) with which to frame an understanding of data.‖ defines irregular warfare as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over a relevant population. 4 Irregular warfare focuses on eroding an adversary's power, influence, and will in order to exercise political authority over a relevant population. 5 Thus, U.S. military doctrine recognizes that war has an irregular characteristic as well as a traditional characteristic that accounts for the nature of wars we are experiencing today. 6 The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC) lists fourteen activities which comprise irregular warfare. Most significant among those activities to S.O.F. are insurgency, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, terrorism, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations. 7 According to the JOC, the defining characteristic of irregular warfare is its focus on a relevant population and its strategic purpose of gaining and maintaining influence or control over that population. 8 It follows then that any measures of progress and effects when conducting irregular warfare activities must capture that same focus on a relevant population and human activities. Quite simply, since irregular warfare is a struggle to gain legitimacy and influence over a population, the force conducting irregular warfare needs measures that gauge influence and legitimacy. This focus on the human component of warfare presents one of the most significant challenges in determining effectiveness in irregular warfare.
This paper focuses on one major irregular warfare activity-counterinsurgency.
Clearly the terms irregular warfare and counterinsurgency cannot be used interchangeably, and this paper does not intend to do so. The paper focuses on this particular irregular warfare activity because it is by far the most prevalent irregular warfare activity with which the U.S. military has been involved and has conducted in the recent past. The U.S. has been conducting it on a larger scale than any other irregular warfare activity. Furthermore, because so much of counterinsurgency depends on a host nation and its military's performance, measuring its progress and effects is more complex than other more direct aspects of irregular warfare. 19 and security (the ability to protect supporters and the population, and local military effectiveness). 20 The guide provides examples of specific questions that the analyst could ask to measure each of the determinants, the answers to which could provide MOE. Although the guide predates the U.S military's current concept of irregular warfare these determinants, with their emphasis on the population, reflect an understanding of the significance of the population to irregular warfare. Indeed, the guide is very clear that control and effectiveness are not measured by who has more physical capabilities such as guns, but by who has more sympathizers and committed supporters. 21 As indicated above, Clancy and Crossett recognize the need to develop a framework to measure progress and effects in irregular warfare, and provide an excellent starting point for such a framework. They reinforce the requirement for appropriate MOE, and argue that everyone involved in irregular warfare must understand the data they face in terms of the overall effectiveness of the campaign; only then can they know if they must change policy, strategy, or operations. 22 In an effort to build the required framework to understand irregular warfare and then develop useful MOE they argue that the general population must perceive an insurgency as legitimate in order for it to survive; the insurgency must be -a legitimate avenue for addressing the needs of society.‖ 23 In developing MOE, therefore, a force must measure its effectiveness in three dimensions: sustainability (effectiveness in disrupting the enemy's ability to sustain a continuing level of violence), 24 legitimacy (the counterinsurgent's ability to -entrench their cause within the population),‖ 25 and stability (stability of the government as perceived by the population). 26 Clancy and Crossett further argue that the counterinsurgent force should focus on specific measures that will indicate success within a given environment, that usually the most influential of these measures focus on the sustainability and legitimacy dimensions, 27 and that these effects must be measured in three battle spaces: physical, cognitive, and information. Based on his study of these factors Manwaring argued that a counterinsurgent's ability to control the situation was based on the presence, to at least some extent, of all of these dimensions. A counterinsurgent must therefore make a balanced effort across these dimensions to be effective. 31 In 2006, Manwaring and Fishel provided an updated examination of the SWORD model in which they updated the -wars within wars‖ and described them as the -legitimacy war,‖ the -shooting war,‖ the -war‖ to isolate belligerents from their internal support, the -war‖ to isolate belligerents from their external support, the -war to stay the course,‖ the -intelligence and information wars,‖ and -wars‖ to unify into a single effort. 32 Of these, the legitimacy war to attack or defend the moral right of a government to exist 33 is the most important. Because a population's grievances about politics, economics, and social conditions cause insurgencies the government must address these grievances first. 34 Several aspects of the SWORD model make it much more useful than the other models discussed in this paper. First, the SWORD model is based on detailed research In addition to the obvious differences of location, the insurgent threat in Mali lacks the resources and widespread popular support to instigate a larger -Taliban-like‖ insurgency such as exists in Pakistan. 47 Still, the threat from AQIM is significant enough to warrant U.S. action. Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans Sahara (JSOTF-TS) therefore is working to build the capacity of host nations affected by AQIM, to include Mali. JSOTF-TS currently conducts operations to enable the Malian military to disrupt AQIM's logistics, finance, recruiting, and safe haven infrastructure and to support the U.S.
embassy's efforts to counter extremist influences throughout Mali. 48 To measure their progress and effects in Mali, JSOTF-TS conducts quarterly formal assessments using an operational capability assessment tool of their own design. 49 The assessment tool is structured to examine several aspects of each of eight of the nine principals of war as described in the Army's FM 3-0, Operations. 50 For each of the principals, the tool measures the following dimensions: (1) unity of command: the ability of the Malians to command and control their forces, to communicate, and the level to which the Malian units are able to achieve unity of effort through synchronized actions, (2) maneuver: number and effectiveness of combat operations, to include patrols, cache seizures, and key leader engagements that the Malians have conducted, (3) offensive: ability to gather and use intelligence and to issue effective operational orders, (4) mass: ability to synchronize actions to allow the commander to mass effects at the decisive time and place, (5) economy of force: the quantity available and ability to use weapons, vehicles, communications, and medical support and equipment, (6) objective: presence of a campaign plan, conduct of patrols, and conduct and effectiveness of counter-recruiting, and (7) From their experiences in JSOTF-P as well as other experiences, the 1 st Special
Forces Group (Airborne) produced a population and resource control handbook titled -Who Owns the Neighborhood?‖ in order to inform their conduct of counterinsurgency with a special emphasis on population and resource control. 54 Along with the handbook, they have developed a counterinsurgency assessment tool to facilitate thorough assessments of the situation and environment. 55 The assessment tool is intended to allow commanders to accurately describe a counterinsurgency environment by facilitating the collation of data which can then be used to assess the performance of the host nation in its counterinsurgency activities. 56 The handbook's emphasis on the requirement to conduct a thorough assessment-and its provision of a tool to do soprior to beginning counterinsurgency operations is significant. A proper assessment is not only a critical first step to establish the best understanding of the environment possible in order to facilitate effective operations, it is also provides an appropriate baseline against which to measure progress and effects. One must truly understand the Operators enter the answers to these questions and indicators into an automated database and assign a numerical rating to assess the host nation's ability to perform each related task. The database then calculates a total score and applies a color code to indicate the host nation force's level of performance for each function. The tool therefore provides an extremely detailed system based on quantifiable data for assessing a counterinsurgent's abilities.
Although the stated purpose of the assessment tool is to allow commanders to accurately describe the environment through a detailed area and country assessment and then develop appropriate solutions, 58 Because the nature of war will always entail opposing forces, one must always address the adversary's actions to some degree when measuring progress and effects.
However, there is more to it than that. Because irregular warfare activities emphasize the significance of the population and irregular warfare objectives are often achieved indirectly, such as through a host nation's conduct of counterinsurgency, it is logical that to properly measure progress and effects we must assess the population and the host nation's performance. Thus measuring progress and effects in irregular warfare entails much more than just counting the number of enemy killed or the size of an area occupied. It must measure items that are harder to quantify, such as a population's attitudes and perceptions, a government's legitimacy, and a counterinsurgent force's performance. Furthermore, there will always be aspects that are not quantifiable. As long as war remains a human endeavor, there will be aspects of war that will require human judgment to measure and assess.
This paper proposes that an effective way to properly measure progress and effects in irregular warfare is build MOE specific to each level of war and based upon the SWORD model framework to best account for the many variables affecting a complex environment. One must select measures that focus upon all of the major actors within that environment, including but not limited to the host nation's government and military, the intervening power, the insurgents and their external support, and the population and the extent to which the population sees the government as legitimate. 
Conclusion
Thus there is no single, all-encompassing list of measures of progress and effects in counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, nor should there be. Every instance of the conduct of irregular warfare activities will occur in its own unique context so combatants must therefore tailor measures of progress and effect specific to that context. However, this paper has shown that there are some general principles that a force can apply when determining how to measure progress and effects.
The SWORD model provides an appropriate and useful framework for building measures of progress and effects. The lessons we learn from measuring progress and effects in counterinsurgency are relevant and can inform measure developed to assess progress and effects in other types of irregular warfare. Because irregular warfare is at its most basic level a struggle for legitimacy over a population any measures of progress and effects must include measurements of legitimacy. Current U.S. military doctrine provides a great starting point for building measures of progress and effects, but it is just that…a starting point. Analysts must then build measures specific to their own context and situation. Because counterinsurgency and many other forms of irregular warfare are indirect activities, sometimes the measures relating to a host nation's government and military are much more significant to measuring progress than adversary-based indicators. And finally, it is important to recognize that because war is a human activity we will never be able to reduce measuring it to totally objective, scientific measures. The best a commander can do is look for indicators that measure as much of the environment as possible, and then use those measures to inform his estimates, opinions, and decisions.
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